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Weekly Situation Report on International Terrorism

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2 December 1975

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Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Page Denied

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

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3.5(c)

WEEKLY SITUATION REPORT

CONTENTS

2 December 1975

NR Articles:

[redacted]

Argentine Police Discover ERP Report on U.S. Embassy (Page 3)

NR

[redacted]

3.5(c)

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Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

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Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Page Denied

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

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Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

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Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Argentine Police Discover ERP Report on U.S. Embassy

On 12 November Argentine police raided a People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) safesite apartment in Buenos Aires, which had been used by two members of the ERP general staff. The police confiscated a large quantity of ERP documents, including a report of some 20 pages in English entitled "The U.S. Embassy in Argentina." The document was not dated but appeared to have been written in about April 1974. The report refers to several U.S. Embassy officials, including the Ambassador. It includes biographic data on some officers, which appears to come mainly from the official U.S. diplomatic Biographic Register, and in some cases attempts to analyze the responsibilities of a particular officer and the reason for his assignment to Argentina. The report also analyzes various embassy functions, especially in the political, labor and intelligence areas. It asserts that the embassy exists primarily to formulate and implement policies to complement the efforts of the right, the local oligarchy and wealthy bourgeoisie, in order to preserve imperialist domination and exploitation.

There was no indication in the document as to whether the ERP had intended to take any sort of action as a result of this report. Among the U.S. personnel named in the document, however, was Alfred A. Laun, director of the USIS center in Cordoba, who was kidnapped by the ERP on 12 April 1974. [redacted] 3.3(b)(1) There has been previous reporting that the ERP was collecting information on the U.S. Embassy, and several other plans for terrorist attacks on the embassy and its personnel have been reported. [redacted] 3.3(b)(1) the ERP believed the U.S. Embassy was supporting the Argentine Anti-Communist Alliance, and therefore the ERP planned to undertake an assassination campaign against embassy personnel. [redacted] the ERP was planning to 3.3(b)(1) kidnap a U.S. diplomat and had assembled a list of all U.S. personnel at the embassy. It is possible that the above document was related to these aborted terrorist plans, as well as the Laun kidnapping. As the ERP apparently compiled the report well over a year ago and has not undertaken any terrorist attack against embassy personnel since early 1974, the recent discovery of the document probably does not indicate any unusual current danger to U.S. diplomats. [redacted] 3.5(c)

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Page Denied

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

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Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

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Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

NR



Page Denied

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

NR

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

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Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

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Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

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Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

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Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

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Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Page Denied

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

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Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

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Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

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3.5(c)

Weekly Situation Report on International Terrorism

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3.5(c)

9 December 1975

Secret 90

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Page Denied

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

WEEKLY SITUATION REPORT

CONTENTS

NR

9 December 1975

NR TAB A - Chronology of Significant International Terrorist Acts

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

NR

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

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Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

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Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

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Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

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Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

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Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ACTS

NR

Date: 8 December 1975

Place: Argentina, Buenos Aires

Mexican Consulate Bombed

A bomb exploded at the Mexican Consulate in Buenos Aires on 8 December, causing property damage. No one was injured. A caller to the Associated Press said the bomb was "repudiation against that traitor Luis Echeverria (Mexican President) who embraced Fidel Castro." Cuban exiles probably were responsible for the bombing. 3.5(c)

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

NR

Page Denied

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

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Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

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Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

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Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

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Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

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Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

~~Secret~~

3.5(c)

Weekly Situation Report on International Terrorism

3.5(c)

16 December 1975

~~Secret~~ 90

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Page Denied

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

SECRET

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3.5(c)

WEEKLY SITUATION REPORT

CONTENTS

16 December 1975

Articles:

[redacted]

NR

Bolivians Arrest ELN Leader and Foil Possible JCR Plot (Page 3)

[redacted]

SECRET

[redacted]

3.5(c)

16 DEC 1975

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Page Denied

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

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Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

NR

Page Denied

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Bolivians Arrest ELN Leader and Foil Possible JCR Plot

In late November or early December, Bolivian authorities arrested Antonio Peredo, the leader of the Bolivian National Liberation Army (ELN), in Cochabamba, Bolivia. Arrested along with Peredo were two Chileans, two Argentinians and a Bolivian. The terrorists were apprehended after Bolivian authorities raided three safe houses in Cochabamba. A number of submachine guns, pistols, and rifles plus a duplicating machine and considerable communist propaganda were also seized.

At an 11 December press conference, Bolivian Minister of the Interior Juan Pereda announced that the captured terrorists were all members of a group known as the Revolutionary Workers Party of Bolivia (PTR-B), which operated under the aegis of the Revolutionary Coordinating Junta (JCR). The PTR-B was formed at a mid-summer meeting in Lima, Peru, which was attended by representatives of the Argentine People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), the Bolivian ELN, and the Chilean Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR)--all members of the JCR, plus representatives of the Argentine Revolutionary Workers Party (PRT) and the Peruvian Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN). Pereda said the objective of the meeting was to coordinate revolutionary activities in the Southern Hemisphere and to form a mass party which would appeal to the working classes.

Pereda further stated that the PTR-B was planning to carry out strikes, sabotage, terrorism and other subversive acts and had organized cells in various industrial and mining areas around Cochabamba. The group planned to destabilize the Bolivian government by creating a lack of confidence in the government among the workers. Pereda also said the group carried false documents which originated, in part, from an unspecified organization in Paris.

There is little doubt that the PTR-B was a bona fide terrorist group. There is a good possibility that the PTR-B was operating with the support and guidance of the JCR. There is documentary evidence that the JCR has close contacts with Peruvian leftists, specifically the Peruvian Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), and that JCR representatives visit Lima from time to time. The Peruvian FALN was a guerrilla group which was active during the middle and late 1960's but

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

was presumed to be moribund since that time. The JCR also is in contact with the Venezuelan FALN, which could cause considerable confusion in terminology. There has been no previous reporting on a JCR meeting in Lima; however, the JCR is believed to hold meetings in various Latin American cities. The actions and goals of the PTR-B are not inconsistent with previously known JCR goals. In the tangled web of Latin American revolutionary politics, however, there are other groups such as the Trotskyist Fourth International which have similar aims and use similar methods. Thus the driving force behind the PTR-B will not be known until further information is received.

American officials on the scene do not have any evidence that the PTR-B had widespread support or even sympathetic contacts in the Cochabamba area and feel that the Minister of the Interior may have been exaggerating the threat for political reasons. They also feel that the details of the supposed cells in the mining and manufacturing areas were vague, which suggests that they were only in the planning stage when the group was wrapped up.

3.5(c)

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

NR

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

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Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

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Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

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Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

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Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

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Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

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Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

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Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

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Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

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Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

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Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

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Page Denied

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

NR

Page Denied

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Secret

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3.5(c)

Weekly Situation Report on International Terrorism

[redacted]

3.5(c)

22 December 1975

Secret 90

22 DEC 1975

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Page Denied

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

SECRET

3.5(c)

WEEKLY SITUATION REPORT

CONTENTS

22 December 1975

NR

Background Article:

The JCR: Is Latin American Terrorism Going Transcontinental? (Page 11)

NR

3.5(c)

22 DEC 1975

SECRET

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

NR

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

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Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

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Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

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Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

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Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

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Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

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Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

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Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

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Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

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Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

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Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

BACKGROUND ARTICLE

The JCR: Is Latin American Terrorism Going Transcontinental?

The Revolutionary Coordinating Junta (JCR) was formed in November 1972 by representatives of the Argentine People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), the Chilean Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), and the Uruguayan Tupamaros. The organization was finally formalized on 13 February 1974, when the above three components plus the Bolivian National Liberation Army (ELN) issued a joint communique proclaiming that the JCR would form a central operational command over all the Latin American liberation movements, composed of representatives of the various member organizations. This command would coordinate guerrilla actions, logistics and financing at a continental level. On 20 February the JCR declared war on the government of Juan Peron and announced that it would "struggle against the allies of imperialism and establish a nationalist third position rejecting United States and Soviet imperialism."

The JCR remained an enigma until the spring of 1975 when Argentine authorities began uncovering evidence of its activities. It began making public statements in Europe, and documentary evidence concerning previously unknown JCR activities was obtained through the arrest of two JCR couriers in Paraguay. These documents revealed that JCR activities had spread far beyond the cone of South America and that the organization maintained contact with a large number of Latin American terrorist groups and had established offices in Europe. Since that time, other information has come to light through various sources which indicates that the scope of JCR activities was much greater than previously suspected.

The single dominating force in the JCR is the ERP. Using the millions of dollars obtained from four years of terrorist activity, the ERP has made itself the driving force behind the JCR, and all other member organizations have taken subordinate positions.

The JCR has been moving to expand its membership and contacts among Latin American terrorist groups. On 17 March 1975 it announced that the Paraguayan National Liberation Front (FREPALINA) had been admitted to the JCR. The JCR is known to have contact with the Venezuelan Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN); the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the pro-Soviet Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC); and

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

the Peruvian Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) and Revolutionary Vanguard (VR); as well as groups in the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, El Salvador and Ecuador. These contacts range anywhere from the exchange of letters to attendance at JCR-sponsored conferences, visits by JCR delegations, and training at JCR camps. The details of most of these contacts are still cloudy, and the extent to which each group is aligned with the JCR has not yet been fully determined.

JCR activities in Europe also have been much more extensive than previously believed. The JCR has or has had offices in Paris, Lisbon and Geneva, plus contacts in Italy and Sweden. It is believed that the JCR may be in contact with certain European extremist organizations, but the details of these contacts are unknown. It now appears that the JCR may be concentrating its European forces in Lisbon.

As far as is known, the JCR itself has never claimed responsibility for a terrorist act. Rather, it has concentrated its activities in four main areas--funding, propaganda, operational support and training.

a. Funding: Money is the glue that holds the JCR together and makes it a viable force. According to one source, 70 per cent of all money collected by member organizations goes to the JCR. It is believed that the ERP obtained over US $30 million in ransom and extortion money in recent years. Just how much of this money the JCR has and funnels back into member and other organizations is not known. Concrete evidence that the JCR is supporting at least one of its member organizations was found in captured JCR documents. According to these documents the ERP sent the Chilean MIR US $300,000 in September 1974, and followed this payment with monthly contributions of US $60,000. It is believed these contributions were kept up at least until the spring of 1975. These same documents stated that the Chilean MIR had received between US $1.5 million and US $2.5 million and that US $4 million was earmarked for the purchase of arms in the United States.

b. Propaganda: Ever since its founding the JCR has been attempting to set up a propaganda mechanism. Its Paris office was responsible for the creation of a JCR press agency, the Agencia de Prensa America Latina (APAL), in December 1974. APAL published a magazine, Boletin APAL, some 20 editions of which were distributed

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

in France, Italy and Argentina. There have also been proposals to distribute Boletin APAL in other European countries, the U.S., Mexico and Venezuela. The JCR has also made a propaganda movie to be used in fund-raising activities and has joined with the Group of Solidarity with the People in Argentina, which is active in the Bertrand Russell Tribunal. The JCR made covert contact in Geneva with representatives of several international organizations dealing with human rights and political refugees, to inspire them to conduct an investigation of human rights in Argentina, and covertly financed the travel to Argentina of two members of the International Commission of Jurists.

c. Operational Support: The JCR has provided extensive operational support to member groups. The JCR has assisted the MIR in establishing bases along the Chilean border from which MIR cadre can operate, and safesites, border-crossing points and logistical support bases also have been provided. The JCR also furnishes weapons and ammunition to member groups. In June 1974 Argentine police uncovered a cache of weapons which was supplying Tupamaros infiltrating back into Uruguay. The cache contained at least 250 submachine guns, ten 357-magnum revolvers, and an unknown quantity of handgrenades and shotguns. In April 1975, Argentine authorities raided a JCR weapons factory which manufactured the organization's own submachine guns, the JCR model 1. The JCR also provides travel documentation to member groups.

d. Training: The JCR has provided both political and guerrilla training to individuals belonging to both member groups and nonmember groups. Training has consisted of political indoctrination as well as guerrilla techniques. One training camp established by the JCR was located on a tobacco plantation between Salta and Jujuy in Argentina. The camp included complete training facilities plus a clandestine airstrip for the transportation of some of the trainees. Individuals being trained at the camp included members of all of the groups belonging to the JCR plus two members of the Colombian FARC.

The extent of Cuba's involvement in the JCR is not known. There have been reports that the JCR was organized at the behest of the Cubans. Many of the individuals belonging to the JCR were trained in Cuba, and JCR representatives travel

22 DEC 1975
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

3.5(c)

regularly to and from Cuba. On the other hand, JCR representatives meeting in March 1975 in Portugal all subscribed to the Pact of Lisbon, part of which stated that Cuba should no longer serve as the only model or source of support for revolutionary activity in Latin America and that the direct responsibility for the development and progress of the Latin American revolutionary movement lies with each individual revolutionary organization. Whether this statement is so much propaganda window dressing to hide Cuban involvement in the JCR, or whether the JCR has shut out the Cubans is not known.

The extent of the threat posed by the JCR is difficult to gauge. Although more is known about the JCR now than in the past, many areas of JCR activity are still nebulous. A concerted effort is being made to find out more about this organization. From what is known so far, however, it is safe to conclude that the JCR could become one of the most active and dangerous forces in international terrorism. It is evident now that the JCR is fairly well organized and its members are well trained. Most importantly, the JCR has money and extensive contacts.

The JCR has weaknesses too. It has not yet enjoyed any conspicuous successes outside Argentina despite vast amounts of money and technical assistance. Secondly, because it is so dominated by the ERP, the JCR will, in all probability, fold up if the ERP goes under. Although the Argentine authorities have enjoyed some success against the ERP in recent months, the effect of this suppression on the ERP structure and the JCR cannot be judged at present.

There are three possible routes that the JCR could take during the next few years. First of all, it could continue expanding its contacts and giving aid and comfort to terrorist groups all over Latin America. This would tend to stabilize rather unstable groups and make them more effective. Secondly, it could contract its forces and concentrate on its primary enemies--governments in the cone of South America--thus cutting the risk of spreading itself too thin. Finally, it could take the Palestinian road, and escalate its activities into a worldwide campaign of terror against its enemies. As it is presently organized, the JCR is capable of all three options or combinations of the three. Although the first two options seem the most likely, it is conceivable that circumstances could drive the JCR leaders to feel that the third is the only option they could take. As it is currently constituted, the JCR could carry out a very effective international terrorist campaign, particularly if it obtained the support of other terrorist groups outside Latin America.

3.5(c)

SECRET

3.5(c)

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

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Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

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Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Page Denied

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Page Denied

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

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Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

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Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

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Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

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Page Denied

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

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Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

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Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

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Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

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Page Denied

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601

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Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C02630601